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Abstract
Maximisation of utility by a single consumer subject to a linear budget
constraint is well known to imply strong restrictions on the properties of
demand functions. Empirical applications to data on households how-
ever frequently reject these restrictions. In particular such data frequently
show a failure of Slutsky symmetry - the restriction of symmetry on the
matrix of compensated price responses. Browning and Chiappori (1998)
show that under assumptions of e¢cient within-household decision mak-
ing, the counterpart to the Slutsky matrix for demands from a k member
household will be the sum of a symmetric matrix and a matrix of rank
k ¡ 1. We establish the rank of the departure from Slutsky symme-
try for couples under the assumption of Nash equilibrium in individual
demands. We show that the Slutsky matrix is the sum of a symmetric
matrix and another of rank at most 2. This result implies not only that
the Browning-Chiappori assumption of e¢ciency can be tested against
other models within the class of those based on individual optimisation,
but also that the hypothesis of Nash equilibrium in demands has testable
content against a general alternative.
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11 Introduction
Maximisation of utility by a single consumer subject to a linear budget con-
straint is well known to imply strong restrictions on the properties of demand
functions. Empirical applications to data on households however frequently
reject these restrictions (see for example, Browning and Meghir (1991), Banks,
Blundell and Lewbel (1997) or Deaton (1990)). In particular such data fre-
quently show a failure of Slutsky symmetry - the restriction of symmetry on the
matrix of compensated price responses.
At the same time, the inadequacy of the single consumer model as a descrip-
tion of decision making for households with more than one member is increas-
ingly being recognised. The problem in assuming families to behave as if they
had the preferences of an individual was well recognised by Samuelson (1956),
who established strong conditions under which such a simpli…ed representation
would hold. A large body of recent research has investigated alternative models
accommodating more realistic descriptions of within-household decision-making
processes.
An important advance is made by Browning and Chiappori (1998), who
show that under assumptions of e¢cient within-household decision making, the
counterpart to the Slutsky matrix for demands from a k member household
will be the sum of a symmetric matrix and a matrix of rank k ¡ 1. Tests
on Canadian data are found to reject symmetry for couples but not for single
individual households. However it is impossible to reject the hypothesis that
the departure from symmetry for the sample of couples has rank 1 as required.
This work is important not only in …lling a gap in our theoretical understanding
of demand behaviour but also in the prospect which it presents of reconciling
demand theory and data on consumer behaviour.
However the assumption of e¢ciency is not satis…ed in all models of house-
hold behaviour which have been suggested. It clearly holds, for instance, in
the Nash bargaining models of Manser and Brown (1980), McElroy and Horney
(1981) or McElroy (1990), and has been the central assumption of papers such
as Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori and Lechene (1994) or Bourguignon and
Chippori (1994). However it is not a property of noncooperative models such as
those of Ulph (1988) or Woolley (1988). While the inability of Browning and
Chiappori to reject the symmetry and rank condition for couples is intriguing, it
is not clear what if any power it has as a test of e¢ciency of intrahousehold deci-
sions unless one understands the nature of the departure from symmetry under
the principal alternative models of household decision making. In particular if
noncooperative models were to give rise to a departure of similar rank then this
would obviously not be a feature of demand behaviour which would be of use in
discriminating between these alternative assumptions about within household
behaviour. On the other hand, if the departure from symmetry under nonco-
operative behaviour were to be of greater rank then the Browning-Chiappori
result would not only promise to reconcile assumptions of optimising behaviour
with demand data but also provide evidence in favour of the collectively rational
model against other descriptions of within-household decision making.
2In this paper we establish the rank of the departure from Slutsky symmetry
for couples under the assumption of Nash equilibrium in individual demands.
We show that the Slutsky matrix is the sum of a symmetric matrix and another
of rank at most 2. This result implies not only that the Browning-Chiappori
assumption of e¢ciency can be tested against other models within the class of
those based on individual optimisation, but also that the hypothesis of Nash
equilibrium in demands has testable content against a general alternative.
2 A non-cooperative Nash model of household
demands
2.1 General framework
Suppose a household consists of two individuals labelled A and B. The house-
hold spends on a set of m private goods q and n public goods Q. The quantities
purchased by the individuals are qA, qB, QA and QB with total household
quantities being q = qA + qB and Q = QA+ QB: Individual utility functions
are uA(qA;Q) and uB(qB;Q). The two partners bring in separate incomes of
yA and yB: Prices of the two sorts of goods are vectors p and P.
Each person decides on the purchases made from their own income so as
to maximise their own utility subject to the spending decisions of the partner.
Hence, A chooses qA and QA to solve
max
qA;QA uA(qA;QA + QB) s. t. pqA + PQA · yA; QA ¸ 0
and B chooses qB and QB to solve
max
qB;QB uB(qB;QA + QB) s. t. pqB + PQB · yB; QB ¸ 0:
Note that we can write these two problems equivalently as
max
qA;Q




uB(qB;Q) s. t. pqB + PQ · yB + PQA; Q ¸ QA:
We concentrate on the case of interior solutions where both partners contribute
to all public goods. In Nash equilibrium the quantities purchased will satisfy
qA = fA(yA + PQB;p;P)
qB = fB(yB + PQA;p;P)
Q = FA(yA + PQB;p;P)
= FB(yB + PQA;p;P):
3where fA(:) and FA(:) are demand functions corresponding to A’s preferences
and together satisfying the usual demand properties including Slutsky symmetry
and fB(:) and FB(:) are demand functions corresponding to B’s preferences, of
which the same is true.
2.2 Demand responses
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In typical budget surveys, we observe total household purchases rather than
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is an appropriate aggregating matrix.
The matrix M has a block upper triangular structure which makes it readily
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0 0 S ¡®T






Im Im (b ¡ a¯)S (a ¡ b®)T
0 0 (In ¡ ¯)S (In ¡ ®)T
¶
where T = (In¡¯®)¡1 and S = (In¡®¯)¡1. These two matrices are intimately
linked and we make free use in the exposition of results linking the two1.
2.3 Income e¤ects
We can derive expressions for the e¤ects of each partner’s income on household
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¶
:
It can be shown that the two columns of this matrix are in fact identical
since
a + (b ¡ a¯)S(In ¡ ®) = b + (a ¡ b®)T(In ¡ ¯) = bS(In ¡ ®) + aT(In ¡ ¯)
(In ¡ ¯)S(In ¡ ®) = (In ¡ ®)T(In ¡ ¯):






The distribution of income within the household is therefore locally irrelevant
to household demands provided that we are at an interior solution. This result
was …rst established in the literature on private provision of public goods by
Warr (1983), Kemp (1984) and Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986), then
later rediscovered in the context of household demand models by Ulph (1988).
It means in the current context that income e¤ects of price changes can be
de…ned straightforwardly since income from any source has the same e¤ect on
household demand.
1In particular, T = In + ¯S®, S = In + ®T¯, ®T = S®, T¯ = ¯S, T¯a = T ¡ In and
®¯S = S ¡ In.
52.4 Price e¤ects and Slutsky symmetry
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Browning and Chiappori (1998) de…ne the pseudo-Slutsky matrix. In the
present context we can see this as what would be calculated in place of the Slut-
sky matrix if the household were treated as behaving according to the unitary











By substitution, we can derive expressions for each of the terms
ª11 = (bS(In ¡ ®) + aT(In ¡ ¯))R(qA + qB)0
+fA
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p
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6But then this can be shown to admit a decomposition









































(In ¡ ®)RqA0 + FA
p








(In ¡ ¯)RqB0 + FB
p




Both ªA and ªB are individual Slutsky matrices and therefore symmetric.
The departure from symmetry therefore depends on the properties of the matrix
¢. This, being the sum of two outer products of vectors is plainly of rank 2 in
general.
2.5 Discussion
This is a result of considerable interest for at least two reasons. Firstly it estab-
lishes that the departure from symmetry has a greater rank in noncooperative
than in cooperative models. The Browning and Chiappori test involving the
rank of this matrix therefore has power against at least one alternative within
the class of models involving individual optimisation. The inability to reject a
rank 1 deviation from Slutsky symmetry in their paper can therefore be seen as
a failure to reject cooperative behaviour against noncooperative models of the
sort treated here.
Secondly it shows that the noncooperative model is itself testable against a
general alternative given su¢cient number of goods.
2.6 Extensions
A number of directions for extending the theory presented here provide the
material for work in progress. In particular, three issues deserve speci…c atten-
tion. Firstly, generalisation to the case of more than two household members
is a promising direction of research, although the two-person case is obviously
empirically the most relevant and important for many societies. Secondly, the
possibility of non-interior solutions with one or more member of the household
choosing not to spend on certain public goods needs to be addressed. Thirdly,
the possibility of ”caring” preferences (see Becker (1991), Bourguignon and Chi-
appori (1994)) in which partners’ preferences depend on ”egoistic” utilities of
7both household members o¤er a feasible way to relax the somewhat mercenary
behaviour evident in cruder versions of noncooperative models.
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